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Scientific Theory Eliminativism 
Peter Vickers 
 
 
 
Abstract   
The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, nature, 
structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories. These disagreements are at least partly responsible 
for disagreements in many of the debates in the discipline which put weight on the concept scientific 
theory. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of theory are ineffectual options 
for addressing this difficulty: they do not move debates forward in a significant way. Directing my 
attention to debates about the properties of particular, named theories, I introduce ‘theory eliminativism’ as 
a certain type of debate-reformulation. As a methodological tool it has the potential to be a highly effective 
way to make progress in the face of the noted problem: post-reformulation disagreements about theory 
cannot compromise the debate, and the questions that really matter can still be asked and answered. In 
addition the reformulation process demands that philosophers engage with science and the history of 
science in a more serious way than is usual in order to answer important questions about the justification 
for targeting a particular set of propositions (say) in a given context. All things considered, we should 
expect the benefits of a theory-eliminating debate-reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly 
significant number of debates of the relevant type. 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
A great number of debates in philosophy of science focus on the properties of, and relations 
between, particular, named scientific theories. Just some of the examples in the literature are as 
follows: (i) debates about the consistency of classical mechanics, classical electrodynamics, 
Bohr’s theory of the atom, and Newtonian cosmology; (ii) debates about whether the following 
theories are deterministic: classical mechanics, general relativity, quantum mechanics, and 
evolution theory; (iii) debates about the time-reversal-invariance of classical mechanics, classical 
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electrodynamics, and quantum mechanics; (iv) debates about whether particular theories make 
particular predictions (too many to mention); (v) the debate about the mutual consistency of 
quantum theory and general relativity, the debate about the reduction of thermodynamics to 
statistical mechanics, and the debate about the (non-)identity of Schrödinger’s wave mechanics 
and Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics. Clearly all such debates crucially depend on the content that 
is ascribed to the theory or theories in question. Accordingly, any such debate may be disrupted 
by cross-talk if two proponents use a theory-name to refer in two subtly different ways. And any 
such debate will be seriously compromised if two proponents disagree on the (debate-relevant) 
content of the theory/theories in question. 
 In fact the opportunities for using theory-names in different ways and for deeply entrenched 
disagreements on theory-content are legion. For eighty years the major debates about theories 
have focused on their overall nature and structure, but even here agreement has not been 
forthcoming. It is still debated whether theories are made up of (or best represented as) axioms of 
first order logic, propositions, abstract models, model-theoretic models, Bayes nets, a state-space 
or phase-space, configurations of synaptic weights, ‘façades’, or a combination of different types 
of representational media.
1
 If this covers the ‘nature’ of theories, there still remains the question 
of the ‘structure’ of theories. Do they have a finite set of specifiable constituents, or a ‘core’ or 
‘essence’ and an ‘auxiliary belt’?2 Do they have an ‘open’ or ‘closed’, or ‘mechanistic’, or 
‘modular’ character?3 But this is just the tip of the iceberg. Even if philosophers of science agree 
that theories are finite, specifiable sets of propositions (say), they may still disagree on precisely 
which set of propositions counts as ‘the theory’ in a given case. Philosophers of science often 
disagree on where to separate the theory from the ‘background assumptions’, the physics (say) 
from the maths, the theory from its idealizations, approximations, and simplifications, and the 
theory from its interpretation, or the underlying metaphysics. This is often because, at a deeper 
level, they disagree on whether theories are instruments for calculation, predictive or explanatory 
                                                          
1
 For a flavour of the range of opinions, see Suppes (1967); Van Fraassen (1980); Giere (1988), Ch.3; 
Suppe (1989); Churchland (1989); Mahner and Bunge (1997), §9.3; Da Costa and French (2003); Wilson 
(2006); Henderson et al. (2010); Muller (2011). 
2
 Gould (2002); Morrison (2007); Lakatos (1970). 
3
 Bokulich (2006); Craver (2002); Darrigol (2008). 
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devices, representations of our beliefs, or our working hypotheses, or any of a number of other 
possibilities. 
 These considerations might lead us merely to appreciate one of the reasons the debates 
mentioned above are usually so difficult, and recognisable progress often so slow: disagreements 
about the properties of, and relations between, particular, named theories supervene on deeper 
disagreements about the content of the theory or theories in question. But one might also wonder 
whether this supervenience relation might be severed by some kind of debate-reformulation 
strategy. There is plenty of inspiration in the literature: in recent years debate reformulations have 
become popular, especially those which urge the elimination of some concept (e.g. Machery 
2009). If the theory-concept is causing so much difficulty in so many debates, we might wonder 
what would happen if it were eliminated. 
Since scientific theory is such a central concept in philosophy of science, one’s intuition may 
be that theory eliminativism will cause chaos and prevent us from talking about most of the 
things we want to talk about. On the contrary I will argue that, at least for the class of debates 
mentioned above—concerning particular, named theories—it can be an extremely powerful tool 
for the philosopher of science: it is possible to reformulate debates so that reference to ‘the 
theory’ and use of theory-names is completely eliminated, whilst retaining all of the questions 
that really mattered to the original debate. In this way a major obstacle to progress in philosophy 
of science is removed. More exactly, I will argue that we should expect the benefits of a theory-
eliminating debate-reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of 
debates of the relevant type. I start with two concrete cases by way of example, before turning in 
later sections to the general story, consideration of benefits versus costs, and responses to 
objections. 
 
2  Is Classical Electrodynamics Inconsistent? 
My first example is the recent debate as to whether ‘classical electrodynamics’ (CED) is 
inconsistent. Frisch (2005) argues that ‘the theory’ is inconsistent, but Muller (2007) and Belot 
 4 
 
(2007) disagree. Who is right? In Vickers (2008) I argue that the disagreement hangs on the fact 
that what Frisch means by ‘classical electrodynamics’ is not what Muller and Belot mean by 
‘classical electrodynamics’. Muller is representative of a rather extreme—but not uncommon—
view in philosophy of science that it is possible to ‘define the theory’. He does this at the 
beginning of his paper as he sees fit, but unfortunately presents something different to Frisch’s 
focus of attention. In what follows there is understandable frustration as Muller strives to 
understand where Frisch is coming from. 
 One response may be that all we have here is a terminological/referential disagreement. But 
reading Muller’s paper there is a clear (if implicit) view that Frisch’s conclusion is without value 
since what it is attached to is ‘not the theory’. Belot is a little more charitable: he sees that Frisch 
is using the term ‘classical electrodynamics’ to refer in a particular way, such that we do end up 
with an inconsistent set of assumptions. He then asks the question whether this is a sensible way 
to conceive of ‘the theory’, and concludes that it is not. In fact he goes as far as to say that 
Frisch’s conception of CED “does not deserve to be called a theory precisely because it is 
inconsistent.” (p.277). However, I have argued (Vickers 2008) that if one is initially tempted by 
Frisch’s conception of the theory, Belot’s objections carry little weight. 
But now consider how things would have developed if Frisch had claimed not that ‘CED is 
inconsistent’, but instead the following: 
 
Here are some assumptions relevant to electromagnetic phenomena which are 
mutually inconsistent [...]. They are inconsistent in the straightforward sense that one 
can deduce a contradiction from them as follows [...]. What is interesting/important 
about the fact that these particular assumptions are inconsistent is as follows [...]. 
 
If Frisch had put things this way, no disagreements about ‘what CED is’ could have arisen, since 
no reference to ‘CED’ is made. Even those with the view that there is a single, canonical form to 
CED could not object that Frisch had got the theory wrong. In fact, whatever views readers had 
on theories, however wild or diverse, those differences of opinion could no longer affect the 
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assessment of Frisch’s claim. Instead the focus of attention would all be directed to whatever 
analysis is given in the third and final set of square brackets in the above statement. 
 The question arises whether this should really be described as a reformulation of the same 
debate, or whether a different debate altogether is being conducted post-reformulation. Obviously 
the debate has changed to some degree, and if the concept of a theory is really going to be 
eliminated some questions will disappear. The most obvious is ‘But is that really classical 
electrodynamics you’re talking about?’ I happen to think this is a bad question, based on a false 
premise, but there is no need for me to argue that here. It will be enough if I can show that, once 
one has filled in the three sets of square brackets in the reconstruction given above, asking this 
further question about whether we’re still talking about CED will not add anything of interest or 
importance vis-à-vis inconsistency in science, or how science works more generally. 
 In fact, Frisch fills in the first two sets of square brackets perfectly well (2005, p.33ff.). The 
big question, though, is why (if) it is an interesting or important result. There are two obvious 
ways in which an inconsistency in science might be interesting, both of which can be articulated 
and debated without making reference to ‘the theory’. First, it might be that all of the inconsistent 
assumptions were genuinely believed by scientists (or at least believed to be candidates for the 
truth). This would only really happen if scientists were unaware that the assumptions are 
inconsistent, in which case it might then be interesting to analyse why, precisely, the 
inconsistency wasn’t noticed, and consider whether there are similar blind-spots in other corners 
of science. However, it is clear that the assumptions Frisch presents were not all considered 
‘candidates for the truth’, so Frisch’s inconsistency could never be interesting in this sense. 
 The second obvious way in which an inconsistency can be interesting/important is when all 
of the assumptions in question were used by scientists, even if they weren’t considered 
‘candidates for the truth’. This is actually quite a common occurrence: it is well known that 
idealization and approximation techniques are ubiquitous in science, especially in physics. 
Especially interesting here is when the relevant de-idealizations are not possible (perhaps because 
the mathematics is intractable): in such circumstances one is sometimes forced to work with an 
inconsistent set of assumptions. In such a case the question arises how one can judge which 
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derivations are trustworthy. Since one is working with assumptions at least one of which is 
definitely false, even if one makes use of truth-preserving inferences one often has no way of 
knowing whether a given inference has taken one from close-to-truth to far-from-truth. 
 It may look like Frisch’s assumptions match this latter case. Certainly his assumption about 
the Lorentz force equation is naturally described as an idealization assumption, and it turns out 
severe problems accompany any attempt at de-idealization. So one might defend Frisch by 
explaining his claim as one where the inconsistency of the assumptions in question is interesting 
because it is a case of scientists routinely reasoning with inconsistent assumptions. One might 
then examine this reasoning further, assessing how scientists went about judging which 
inferences were trustworthy, and whether there are lessons for how scientists should reason in the 
face of inconsistencies in current science (e.g. the conflict between general relativity and 
quantum theory). 
Whether Frisch’s claims are in fact defensible in this way is not the point of current concern. 
The worry was that, in making the reformulation, something important is lost from the original 
debate. But the discussion just given shows how whatever it is that may be important about 
Frisch’s original claim does not require mention of ‘classical electrodynamics’ or ‘the theory’ for 
articulation and discussion. One may ask how we would answer the question ‘But is that really 
CED you’re talking about?’ The answer will be that that is beside the point. One might reply: 
“No, but so what? – It’s nevertheless an interesting result for the reasons just given concerning 
trustworthiness of inferences.” Or one might reply: “Yes, but that’s not what makes it an 
interesting result – what makes it an interesting result are the reasons just given.” Or one might 
reply: “You’re question is based on a false premise about the identity of CED—the answer is 
neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’—but anyway, what makes it an interesting result are the reasons just 
given.” 
This shows one sense in which nothing of significance is lost if we reformulate the debate 
according to the above schema. Personally I find it difficult to imagine how else something 
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important could be left behind if we eliminate theory-talk. Some further considerations on this 
point will be discussed in §4, below.
4
 
 
3  Is Classical Mechanics Deterministic? 
Before I turn to the general story it will be instructive to see how theory eliminativism applies in 
another case, concerning a different theory and a different property. One obvious candidate is the 
longstanding debate as to whether ‘classical mechanics’ (CM) is deterministic. Several authors 
have urged that it is indeterministic, whereas others maintain that it is deterministic, such that one 
reaches the opposite conclusion only by misunderstanding ‘what the theory is’.5 And Wilson 
(2009) argues that the theory is neither deterministic nor indeterministic, because there are 
different ‘species’ of classical mechanics, some of which are deterministic and some of which are 
not. Again we have a clear case of disagreements about the content of the theory causing 
disagreements in the debate. 
But instead of claiming that ‘classical mechanics’ is/is not deterministic, one can instead 
eliminate talk of ‘classical mechanics’ from the debate by reformulating one’s statements as 
follows: 
 
Here are some assumptions which imply the determinism/indeterminism of the 
mechanics of moving bodies [...]. Let me demonstrate this [...]. What is interesting 
and important about the fact that these particular assumptions imply (in)determinism 
is as follows [...]. 
 
In this way, any disagreements about whether classical mechanics is deterministic based on 
disagreements about what the content of the theory is will disappear from view. In this way, 
progress is much more readily achievable on the question of whether there are any interesting or 
important indeterminisms concerning hypotheses made about the mechanics of moving bodies. 
                                                          
4
 The (in)consistency of classical electrodynamics is considered in greater detail in Vickers (2013, Ch.4). 
5
 In the first camp we find Earman (1986), Hutchison (1993), and Norton (2008). Amongst those who think 
the theory is deterministic we find Arnold (1977), Korolev (2007), and Zinkernagel (2010). 
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But as with the case of the consistency of CED, the major question which arises is whether in 
eliminating reference to ‘the theory’ we lose something important from the original debate. 
What is important about the original debate? Perhaps the most obvious answer is that, if it 
can be shown that classical mechanics is indeterministic, then one might be well placed to argue 
that individuals in the history of science were implicitly committed to something they would have 
wanted to reject. This would be interesting since it raises the questions of why they didn’t notice, 
how it would have changed things if they had noticed, and what we can learn from this about 
things we might be blind to in current science. 
 But these issues can be debated more efficiently without talk of ‘classical mechanics’ or ‘the 
theory’. First (i) one can identify the assumptions pertinent to the point one is trying to make—
e.g. Newton’s three laws of motion. Second (ii) one can show that, given these assumptions, the 
mechanics of bodies is indeterministic (say) in certain contexts. Then (iii) one has to make the 
case that this is interesting/important. For example, one might carry out some historical work to 
argue that relevant characters from the history of science (1) accepted these assumptions, (2) 
weren’t aware of the indeterminism, and (3) would have found the indeterminism intolerable, had 
they been aware of it. 
 Opposition to this story can then also proceed without reference to ‘classical mechanics’ or 
‘the theory’. One may argue that the indeterministic ‘contexts’ in question are either ‘unphysical’ 
or make use of ‘inadmissible idealizations’ (Norton 2008). One might argue that relevant 
scientists made other assumptions, in addition to Newton’s laws, which do then assure 
determinism in the given contexts (Korolev 2007). Or one might argue against the claim that 
Newton’s laws by themselves entail indeterminism, either claiming that Newton’s laws in fact do 
assure determinism when properly understood (Zinkernagel 2010), or by arguing that Newton’s 
laws by themselves entail neither determinism nor indeterminism (Wilson 2009). In this way 
everything we might want to say can be said. Adding claims such as “classical mechanics 
actually consists of more than just Newton’s laws” or “determinism is an axiom of classical 
mechanics” add nothing of value, and only cause the sorts of damaging disagreement and 
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miscommunication noted above. The answer to the question “But is that really the theory you’re 
talking about?” will follow the model of the previous case study (above). 
  
4  Costs and Benefits of Theory Eliminativism 
Extension to the general case is straightforward. For any claim that might be made of the form 
“Theory T has property X” one can say instead, 
 
Here is a set of analysanda which have the property X [...]. This can be demonstrated 
as follows [...]. What is interesting and important about the fact that these particular 
analysanda have that property is as follows [...].
6
 
 
Mutatis mutandis for debates about relations between particular theories. The important question 
now is why we should expect such a reformulation to be beneficial to a ‘highly significant 
number’ of the debates mentioned in §1, above.7 
 First of all it is clear that the reformulation process will eliminate talk of ‘the theory’, and 
use of theory-names, for every such debate. This has some immediate benefits: 
miscommunication due to subtle differences in intended reference of theory-names ceases to be 
possible. More importantly, any stalemates due to deeply entrenched disagreements about the 
content of the theory in question are dissolved. This is because one does not just eliminate a 
word, keeping the corresponding concept in the background guiding one’s analysis. Instead the 
debate continues entirely without the concept theory and (crucially) without other concepts 
dependent upon the concept theory. One talks instead in terms of the specified analysanda 
(assumptions, models, equations, axioms, whatever), one’s conceptions of which do not depend 
on one’s theory-concept, since they are more basic. 
                                                          
6
 The term ‘analysanda’ covers assumptions, equations, models, axioms, propositions, or whatever set of 
things the philosopher wishes to consider together as a unit of analysis. There need be no restriction here, 
since the justification for targeting that set of things will be given in the third set of square brackets. 
7
 In Vickers (2013) I apply theory eliminativism to a number of debates concerning the (in)consistency of 
particular ‘theories’. The fullest argument for theory eliminativism combines the more general 
considerations in this paper with the concrete applications found in Vickers (2013). 
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 These will be important benefits of theory eliminativism only if there existed in the original 
debate some cross-talk or disagreement concerning the theory-content in question. Probably this 
won’t happen in every case: in some debates we might expect that any disagreements over theory 
content will concern content that isn’t at issue for the property or relation in question. E.g. if we 
are debating whether a theory makes a given prediction, it won’t matter if philosophers disagree 
about theory-content that doesn’t play any role in generating that prediction. But on the other 
hand one might well expect there to be relevant disagreements over theory-content for many of 
the debates in question. As I noted in §1, the conceptual space available to us when we consider 
the content of a given theory is extremely large. Philosophers cannot agree on even the type of 
thing theories are made up of (even philosophers working in the same sub-discipline, e.g. 
philosophy of physics—the debates discussed in §§2 and 3 are cases in point). And alongside 
these large differences of opinion on theory content, debates about the properties of/relations 
between theories are usually extremely sensitive to the content that is ascribed to the theories in 
question. The slightest change in content can make the difference to whether a theory is 
inconsistent, deterministic, time-reversal-invariant, and so on, or to whether two theories are 
equivalent, mutually inconsistent, reducible one to the other, etc. 
 With these considerations in mind it is no surprise that concrete examples in the literature 
are not hard to find. In addition to general considerations which suggest that there will be many 
such examples, I can here add a few more concrete examples to those already given. First, 
consider the consistency of Bohr’s theory of the atom. Lakatos (1970), Brown (1992), Priest 
(2002), and Da Costa and French (2003) claim that it is inconsistent, whereas Bartelborth (1989), 
and Hettema (1995) claim that it isn’t. Who is right? It depends on which parts of CED we 
include as part of Bohr’s theory. Bartelborth argues that only ‘quasi-electrostatics’ should be 
admitted, whereas Brown suggests that the whole of CED must be included because there were 
applications of old quantum theory where CED was used. The question arises whether we have 
an internally inconsistent theory, or two theories (Bohr’s theory and CED) which are mutually 
inconsistent. But even if we take the ‘one theory’ view, we don’t have an inconsistency if we 
interpret some of the ‘=’ symbols as ‘≈’ symbols, a move that Muller (2007) urges: 
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[P]hysicists are notoriously sloppy in this respect: a majority of the exact equality 
signs (=) in most physics papers, articles, and books mean approximate equality (≈). 
(p.261) 
 
So whether we should refer to ‘Bohr’s theory’ as inconsistent depends crucially on one’s views 
about how one should decide upon and interpret the content of the theory. And one finds 
multiple disagreements on just this issue in the relevant literature.
8
 
Consider also the question of whether Bohr’s theory predicts the intensities of the hydrogen 
spectral lines. Smith (1988) argues that it does because it includes (a particular formulation of) 
the correspondence principle. But compare Shapere (1977): 
 
[T]he Bohr theory offered no way to account for the intensities and polarizations of 
the spectral lines… Use of the correspondence principle as a basis for calculating the 
polarizations of the lines is not considered here as a ‘part of the theory.’ (p.559) 
 
Whether the theory makes the prediction or not (and hence whether it might be 
confirmed/disconfirmed) depends on your view of what the theory is. And philosophers really do 
disagree on the content of the theory in such a way that they disagree on whether the theory 
makes the prediction in question. 
 As a final example—this time concerning a relation between two different theories—
consider the debate as to whether Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and Schrödinger’s wave 
mechanics are equivalent. The common assumption that Schrödinger in 1926 proved the 
equivalence of the theories has been labelled ‘a myth’ by Muller (1997a, 1997b), but yet we do 
have an equivalence according to Perovic (2008). The reason for the disagreement does depend 
in part on how one interprets ‘equivalence’.9 But it also undoubtedly depends on the content 
attributed to ‘matrix mechanics’ and ‘wave mechanics’: Perovic argues that Muller’s 
inequivalence claim is based on ‘a narrow model of physical theory’. In other words it is based 
on Muller’s particular view of what constitutes the theories, a view that Perovic does not share. 
                                                          
8
 For more on the (in)consistency of Bohr’s theory of the atom, see Vickers (2013, Ch.3). 
9
 Similarly with many of the other properties and relations in many of the other debates I have mentioned. 
 12 
 
 It remains an open question how many debates of the relevant type are currently stumbling 
on the concept theory in the stated way, such that theory eliminativism is warranted for this 
reason alone (given insignificant costs—see below). The prior discussion suggests it will be a 
significant number, but this is just one consideration: the warrant for theory eliminativism does 
not depend solely on this. Another important benefit concerns the new questions that the 
reformulation process forces one to answer. Specifically, by forcing one to say explicitly what is 
interesting/important about the claim, it becomes impossible for one to hide behind the concept 
theory, as if it’s obvious that it’s an important claim simply because ‘the theory’ has that 
property. Instead the reformulation process demands that philosophers answer important 
questions about the justification for targeting a particular set of analysanda. Why, exactly, are the 
selected analysanda important to consider together, as a set, in the given context? Is it because of 
their relevance to the history of science, or certain scientific characteristics of the set, such as 
predictive and explanatory power? In forcing us to ask such questions, theory eliminativism 
works as an indirect means for bringing philosophers of science to engage more directly, more 
seriously, with science and the history of science. Consequently it will either be stated much 
more clearly why the claim in question is an important result, or in the process of reformulation 
one may find that the claim isn’t as interesting/important as originally supposed, and reconsider 
making it in the first place. For example, compare Frisch (2008) reflecting on his original claim 
that ‘CED is inconsistent’: “I am inclined to agree with my critics that this inconsistency in itself 
is less telling than my previous discussions may have suggested.” (p.94). In short, the extra work 
required by reformulation is likely to be time well spent, not simply time spent saying in a 
convoluted way what one could have said much more succinctly in terms of ‘the theory’. 
These are the principal benefits of theory eliminativism. What are the costs? In the case 
studies considered in §§1 and 2 I considered the possibility that reformulation leaves behind 
something important from the original debate, and argued that this was not the case. Should we 
expect this to generalise? 
I can’t hope to argue that nothing of significance would be left behind from any debate. This 
would require an in-depth study of each debate. But I can at least consider the most obvious 
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questions that would be left behind if we eliminated theory. The first such question is the one 
already considered in §§1 and 2: one can no longer ask “But is that really the theory you’re 
talking about?” Suppose somebody does ask this. Then there is no difficulty in generalising the 
answer already presented in §1, above. One answers “Who cares? I’ve already told you all of the 
reasons why it’s interesting and important that the specified set of analysanda has the property it 
does—so it adds nothing to the importance of the claim if that set is the theory, and it takes 
nothing away if it isn’t.” (mutatis mutandis for relations between sets of analysanda). 
But in addition one might wonder whether we lose the ability to ask whether the set of 
analysanda in question would have been (or is) referred to as (part of) ‘the theory’ by scientists. 
One might be concerned that, since one can’t use the term ‘theory’, one can’t ask this question, 
and so one loses the ability to consider a sense in which the established result (e.g. inconsistency 
of a set) has historical relevance. In other words one might think that without using the term 
‘theory’ one can’t properly fill in that all-important third set of square brackets. 
But this is to mix up asking questions about theories and asking questions about how certain 
terms such as ‘theory’ and ‘classical mechanics’ were used by practitioners in the history of 
science. Theory eliminativism rules out conceiving of the history of science as containing 
theories as things that exist (in some sense) and have properties, stand in relations, etc. But it 
does not rule out questions about the way scientists use/used terms such as ‘theory’ and ‘classical 
mechanics’, or how they thought these terms referred. In the course of filling in that third set of 
square brackets one might want to start by arguing that scientists working at the time referred to 
the specified assumptions as ‘the theory’. One would then have to make the case that this leads to 
important and/or interesting conclusions. In general, in filling in this third set of square brackets, 
it’s going to be more important to consider which analysanda scientists used, how they used 
them, whether they believed them, and so on; it’s not going to be so important to consider how 
scientists used certain terms to refer. But theory eliminativism, properly understood, does not rule 
this out. 
Indeed, theory eliminativism does not even rule out contemporary philosophers making use 
of terms such as ‘the theory’ and ‘formulation of the theory’—one might follow the suggested 
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model and then simply add “and I call this set of analysanda ‘(a formulation of) the theory’.” In 
that case the term in question is just being used as a label, and doesn’t carry any conceptual 
weight. However, I don’t recommend this approach: it presents a danger because many readers 
will insist that that’s an improper use of the term. In fact, in the debate over CED, Frisch tells us 
explicitly how he is using the term ‘theory’ (2005, p.26) but this didn’t stop Muller and Belot 
responding ‘That’s not the theory!’ (give or take). 
These considerations go some way towards indicating why nothing of significance will be 
left behind if we reformulate debates of the relevant type. Some readers may think they don’t go 
far enough. But given the potential benefits of theory eliminativism, and the concrete examples 
provided above (and also in Vickers 2013), perhaps it will not be too much to shift the burden of 
proof at this stage. Despite the fact that we are asked to manage without a concept which is 
currently ubiquitous in the literature, why should we expect something to be lost? We may ask: 
what can be said in terms of ‘theory’, that cannot be said in terms of analysanda (equations, 
models, propositions, etc.) which are being put together and considered as a group in a particular 
context for particular purposes? I put it to the objector to provide such examples. One example 
would not do, since I am not arguing that theory eliminativism should be applied to every debate 
of the relevant type: to repeat, I am only claiming here that we should expect the benefits of 
reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the 
relevant type. And it wouldn’t be enough if the cost is small, since I’ve already indicated the 
significant benefits one might expect. 
This covers the principal benefits and costs. How do they bear on my conclusion that we 
should expect the benefits of a theory-eliminating reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for 
a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type? I use the word ‘heavily’, since the 
costs are almost non-existent (I have found nothing of significance that is left behind), and the 
benefits can be enormous (dissolution of stalemates in the literature; emergence of new questions 
which force philosophers to engage more directly and seriously with science and the history of 
science, and thus to consider more carefully the deep reasons why we should care about their 
conclusions). I say a ‘highly significant number’ for two reasons: first, I expect—given what I 
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said about the sheer number of different ways in which philosophers can and do disagree about 
the content of theories, and the apparent ubiquity of examples of such disagreements affecting 
debates in the literature—that many of the debates I mentioned in §1 will benefit from theory 
eliminativism. But second, it would be highly significant if just a few debates benefited, since the 
reformulation of these debates would fruitfully re-direct the research energy of a large number of 
philosophers in the field. For a concrete example one need only reflect on how things would have 
developed if Frisch (2005) had followed the eliminativist model. 
 
5  Objections and Replies 
Responses to some of the most obvious objections are embedded in the clarifications of the 
previous section. Some further possible objections are considered below. 
 
Objection 1. “Theory eliminativism does resolve certain problems, as claimed, but these 
problems get resolved anyway in the natural course of philosophical debate.” I should perhaps 
emphasise that I do not claim that theory eliminativism is the only way to circumvent 
miscommunication and dissolve stalemates based on the identity of theories. It is just a way to 
achieve these ends quickly and effectively. And since I do not claim that the benefits of theory 
eliminativism will always outweigh the costs, I will happily grant that sometimes the problems 
will be quickly resolved without eliminating the theory-concept. But theory eliminativism is 
worth taking seriously if there are some other times when the problems would not be resolved 
quickly without eliminating the theory-concept. And in addition one needs to factor in the benefit 
concerning the justification for targeting a particular set of analysanda. In this case there isn’t an 
obvious disagreement crying out for resolution, as in the case of a miscommunication or 
stalemate. Instead there is simply an important question which is not being asked. Can we sit 
back, confident that it will be asked, and answered, in the natural course of philosophical debate? 
Since there is no obvious disagreement there is every chance it will remain ignored or 
overlooked for a significant period of time, especially if protagonists tend to think one can justify 
targeting certain analysanda by simply saying “They are the theory” (cf. the concrete examples 
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discussed above). Theory eliminativism ensures protagonists have something far more 
substantial to say about why exactly their chosen analysanda deserve attention in the context of 
the specific debate in question. 
 
Objection 2. “If there’s a problem with the way people are thinking about theories, which is then 
affecting other debates, why not put our energy into clarifying what a theory is, drawing on 
theories of theories or conceptual analysis?” Nickles (2002, pp.8-11) makes this suggestion for 
debates about inconsistency in science. We should sort out our theory of theories first, he says, 
since if theories turn out to be families of models then they won’t even be the kind of thing 
which can be inconsistent. But this is too optimistic: it asks us to shelve our debates about the 
properties and relations of particular theories until we know what theories are. But eighty years 
of work in philosophy of science has brought us nowhere near to a consensus on the nature and 
structure of theories. And even such a consensus would not tell us how to identify the particular 
constituents of a particular theory. This is not to rule out literature on ‘theories of theories’ as 
worthless: it can still play an important role in any reformulated debate. Giere (1988) can put 
together a family of abstract ‘scientific’ models as his analysanda, and Muller (2011) can put 
together a “set of structures in the domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory, characterised by 
a set-theoretical predicate.” What is left behind is any claim that one is focusing on these things 
because ‘that’s what a theory is’. Instead, the point of focusing on these things must be argued 
much more explicitly, by way of filling in that third set of square brackets. 
Turning to conceptual analysis, one wouldn’t even know which theory of concepts to start 
with to attempt a conceptual analysis of theory: options include neo-classical theory, prototype 
theory, the theory theory, the neo-empiricist view, and conceptual atomism. Then there is the 
question of the relationship between the concept theory, the concept of a particular theory (e.g. 
classical electrodynamics), and the content that should be ascribed to a particular theory. This is 
not a helpful solution; it is a minefield. 
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Objection 3. “You need to argue that theories don’t exist. If they do, then ‘Is that the theory 
you’re talking about?’ remains an important question. And in the reformulation, we lose this 
important question.” In fact it’s not such a popular claim these days that theories exist as human-
independent entities; Popper’s arguments to this end are widely discredited as unsound. At any 
rate, the burden of proof here lies with the objector, who is making the strong positive claim that 
theories do exist. And even if they do, my claim is only that one doesn’t lose anything from the 
original debate if you reformulate. E.g. consider again the debate over the consistency of CED: 
the inconsistency can be highly interesting, regardless of whether the unit of analysis is or is not 
the theory, and also regardless of whether we should or should not call that unit of analysis ‘the 
theory’. 
 
Objection 4. “If lots of people have different views on theories, and in particular on the content of 
particular theories, why not be a pluralist about theories?” Pluralism would seem to resolve some 
of the tensions noted in the above case studies. For example, in the debate over the consistency of 
CED one might say that Frisch has one theory-concept (focusing on the equations that are used 
by scientists) and Belot and Muller have another theory-concept (focusing on the equations that 
are/were believed by scientists). One might draw here on Kenat (1987) and Suppe (1989) who 
(drawing on a paper by Sylvain Bromberger) distinguish two types of theory: ‘Theories1’ are 
‘theories as techniques for developing answers to problems’, and ‘Theories2’ are ‘propositions’. 
We might then index these theory-concepts, and say that CED1 is inconsistent, and CED2 is 
consistent. 
 This may seem like a good solution on the surface, but the details tell a different story. Do 
we expect that we will find a manageably finite number of theory-concepts, analogous to the 
three major species-concepts, or the three major acid-concepts? Given the multitude of 
disagreement already noted, this seems optimistic. The overarching question is, how should we 
identify and index (some of) the different theory-concepts? Obviously ‘theories as techniques for 
developing answers to problems’ and ‘theories as propositions’ are too vague to be useful 
(descriptions of) theory-concepts. However, one may also ask how useful more specific theory-
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concepts are, such as ‘a theoryi is a set of propositions put forward as serious candidates for the 
explanatory truth of a given domain of phenomena, and the deductive closure thereof’. This will 
still lead us to very little determinate content for a given theory, since we will have to ask just 
how ‘serious’ the candidacy is, just what is meant in real terms by ‘put forward’, how we 
delineate the ‘given’ domain of phenomena, and so on. 
 Even if we could identify and index theory-concepts, the big question for this paper is 
whether pluralism could help us resolve debates about the properties of, and relations between, 
particular theories. The main problem here is that pluralism is going in the wrong direction: 
philosophers of science don’t first think of a theory-concept and then apply it to reveal a given 
theory’s content (to the extent that this is possible, given the vagueness necessarily inherent in 
any theory-concept). Instead, theory constituents are put together based on years of experience 
analysing and solving problems with the theory. So, for example, the contents of CED provided 
by Frisch, Belot, and Muller in the debate mentioned above do not fit comfortably in any obvious 
theory-concept that might be invented. There are issues that are theory-specific, that a general 
theory-concept would never accommodate. For example, the three ‘species of classical 
mechanics’ that Wilson (2009) distinguishes in the debate over the (in)determinacy of classical 
mechanics would not be identified by any general account of ‘theory kinds’, since they pertain to 
different ways of conceptualising the basic ontology of mechanics. The only theory concepts that 
could underwrite these three ‘species’ of the theory would be ones cooked up post-hoc, purely to 
accommodate this case. But under such circumstances the theory-concepts in question have failed 
to do what we wanted them to do: the idea was that delineating a plurality of theory-concepts 
could help us identify legitimate decisions on theory content, not the other way around.
10
 
 Finally, one might argue that pluralism about theory-concepts in general is little help, but 
pluralism about particular theories is more help. The idea here would be that one can delineate 
different ‘contents’ for any given theory, without any overarching general theory of theory-
content explaining these different ‘contents’ (since that would just bring us back to a general 
                                                          
10
 There is also the question of why all the different theory-concepts get to be unified as theory-concepts, as 
opposed to being just a number of concepts. 
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theory-concept pluralism). Instead one would have to justify why, in the context of a given 
debate, it was appropriate to focus on a given number of analysanda. In fact this just brings us to 
the theory-eliminativism advocated here: if one has specified the precise content one is 
considering, and explained why it is appropriate to consider it in the given context, calling that 
content ‘a formulation of the theory’ is to use this locution as a mere label for the specified 
content. Otherwise the particular-theory pluralist has closely related problems to the theory-
concept pluralist: she is committed to a plurality of individuals, all of which deserve the title 
‘formulation of the theory’ for some reason that requires articulation. 
 
Objection 5. Let me respond to the reader who would prefer the label ‘theory-quietism’ to 
‘theory-eliminativism’. Unfortunately there are problems with both options, since what I am 
proposing is different in important ways from other ‘quietist’ and ‘eliminativist’ positions which 
have been put forward. For example, French (2010) proposes a ‘pragmatic quietism’ about the 
ontology of scientific models and theories, but this differs significantly from the position 
proposed here, for example because French makes no claim that we should stop making use of 
the concept of a ‘model’ or ‘theory’ in our debates, only that we should stop asking questions 
about their ontology. The main differences from other eliminativist positions are (i) that it is a 
pragmatic and not an ontological claim (so it’s not like claims for ‘species’-eliminativism, 
‘innate’-eliminativism, ‘belief’-eliminativism, etc.), and (ii) it is selective in the sense that it is 
only to be applied when there is a warrant for it. However, my sense is that the proposal is close 
enough to other eliminativisms that ‘theory eliminativism’ is a perfectly sensible term. For 
example, in Machery (2009) the motivation for ‘concept eliminativism’ is partly pragmatic, and 
so application will be selective (dependent on pragmatic factors), just like theory eliminativism. 
   
6  Conclusion 
These are necessarily preliminary considerations, and as such it is important to be neither too 
optimistic nor too pessimistic. Too optimistic and one is in danger of making overblown claims 
about a revolution in philosophy of science, a discipline which traditionally has put heavy weight 
 20 
 
on the concept scientific theory. Too pessimistic, and one may miss an opportunity. If, as I claim, 
the benefits of theory eliminativism will heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant 
number of debates of the relevant type, then that would be remarkable. The two concrete 
examples of §§2 and 3, together with the general considerations of §4, persuade me that we have 
good reason to expect highly significant consequences to result from wider employment of 
theory eliminativism. But even if I’m overly optimistic, concerted action is warranted if there is 
but a small chance of a highly significant impact. 
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